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Abstract 
 
 The purpose of this study was to determine whether the effects of the Kribi Deep 
Seaport project will be positive for economic development in Cameroon, and how the 
Port will affect Cameroon’s regional and global role. The study was conducted over a 
one-month period and was primarily qualitative in nature. The principal method of 
inquiry was interviews, which were complemented by quantitative secondary source 
research. Although most informants asserted that the project was a positive step for the 
country, the information they provided led me to conclude that the project was 
undertaken prematurely and will not promote sustainable economic development in 
Cameroon. There were several findings that led me to this conclusion. First, the lack of 
adequate educational infrastructure in the country, excluding most Cameroonians from 
taking advantage of the employment opportunities generated. Second, the lack of 
transparency and the demonstrated inability of the government to effectively utilize 
revenues, meaning that natural resource wealth would be wasted. The final result that led 
to my conclusion was the negative implications of the expansion of the relationship with 
China that the Port entails. Ultimately, the Port is a good project in principle, but the 
current circumstances will nullify the potential benefits.  
 
Résumé  
 
 Le but de ce projet était de déterminer si les effets du Port en Eau Profonde a 
Kribi seront positifs pour le développement économique du Cameroun, et comment le 
Port va changer le rôle du Cameroun régionalement et globalement. L’étude était fait 
pendant un mois et c’était principalement qualitatif. La méthode principale était les 
entretiens, qui étaient complémentés par les ressources secondaires quantitatifs. Malgré le 
fait que la plupart des participants pensaient que le Port sera une bonne chose pour le 
pays, l’information qu’ils m’ont donnés a indiqué que le Port ne va pas promouvoir  le 
développement durable du Cameroun. Il y a trois faits principaux qui supportent cette 
conclusion. En premier lieu, il y a l’absence d’une infrastructure de formation 
professionnelle au Cameroun, qui excluent la plupart des Camerounais de tirer profit des 
emplois que seront générés. Deuxièmement, il y a le manque de transparence et 
l’incapacite du gouvernement d’utiliser convenablement les recettes. Le dernier fait qui 
appuie ma conclusion et les impacts négatifs de la relation croissante avec le Chine, que 
le Port encouragera. Enfin le Port est un bon projet en principe, mais les circonstances qui 
existent au Cameroun vont détruire les bénéfices potentiels.   
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I. Introduction  
Key Terms & Background  
The most important term to understand for this study is what a “deep sea port” 
consists of, and how it differs from a regular port. Cameroon already has the Port of 
Douala, which receives heavy regional and global traffic. However, because this is an 
estuary Port it has to be dredged every year in order for even moderately large ships to 
dock. Many ships cannot enter at all, which means they have to anchor offshore while 
their contents are ferried to the Port.1 In contrast, the Port currently being built in Kribi 
will be capable of accepting the largest ships in the world. Additionally, the Kribi Deep 
Sea Port Complex is planned as more than just a maritime center, but also an entire 
industrial complex and city. Light rail, roads, agro-industry, and research and 
development are among the many projects to be undertaken. The Port Complex Master 
Plan also describes the plans for an entirely modern residential city, intended to grow 
around the Port industrial areas.2 Officials project that this residential community will 
exceed 100,000 inhabitants by 2040.3   
Given the extensive nature of this project, Cameroon lacked the funds and 
technical expertise to take it on alone. Although they had initially collaborated with 
France, when Europe was hard hit by the financial crisis in 2008 France no longer had the 
means to fund it. Cameroon then turned to the East, and in 2008 the government agreed 
                                                 
1
 Amougou, Roland. Personal Interview. 22 April 2013. Port direction office; Kribi.    
2
 Royal Haskoning. “Spatial Master Plan.” March 2012. p. 13.   
3
 Amougou. Interview. 22 April 2013.    
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to a 207 billion CFA concessionary loan with the Chinese Export-Import (EXIM) Bank 
to finance the project. A Chinese company, China Harbour Engineering Corporation 
(CHEC), was designated by EXIM bank to preform the pre-construction studies and the 
construction itself. A U.S.-based construction consultancy, Louis Berger, won the 
contract for the technical assistance and supervisory role. The odd aspect of this project is 
that the same company, CHEC, preformed both the initial studies and the construction. 
Normally, an outside group performs all pre-construction studies, to determine everything 
from environmental impacts to what the thickness of the concrete in the walkways should 
be. The construction company then follows those plans under the guidance and inspection 
of the technical assistant group. In this case the Chinese company is following plans that 
they drew up themselves, so checks and balances have been limited.4  
The Port is scheduled to accept the first ship in 2014, and there are numerous 
stakeholders that have plans for how the Port will be used. United States enterprises are 
hoping to exploit Cameroon’s rich oil resources, joining the French company GDF-Suez 
that already has a contract for extraction near the Port.5 CamIron, an affiliate of the 
Austrialian Company Sundance resources, is planning to build a railway between their 
iron-mining site and the Port, and handle all their exports through Kribi. The Port will be 
a hub of trade for the entire region, and will also serve Chad and the Central African 
Republic. In the current port of Douala each of these countries has its own terminal, but 
so far the logistics of dividing the Kribi Port have yet to be determined.6 Yet even a 
minister from nearby oil-exporter Equatorial Guinea has purportedly visited Cameroon to 
                                                 
4
 Musoles, Fernando. Personal Interview. 11 April 2013. Louis Berger Yaoundé office.    
5
 Mamadou. Interview. 11 April 2013. United States Embassy.  
6
 Amougou, Roland. Interview. 22 April 2013.   
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discuss a stake in the Port. All initial signs indicate that the Kribi Port will indeed become 
a crowded hub of international commerce.   
Yet for many Cameroonians, the Kribi Deep Sea Port remains a vague concept 
with no visible link to their lives. In a country where 30 percent of the population lives on 
less than two dollars a day, and 29 percent are illiterate,7 big infrastructure has minimal 
significance for many citizens. However, according to Paul Biya’s Vision 2035 goals, the 
“grands realisations” big infrastructure projects that the government is undertaking will 
improve the lives of Cameroonians at every socioeconomic level. As the focal point of 
the “grands realisations” strategy, the Kribi Deep Sea Port is the linchpin of the Vision 
2035 goals.8 These goals include reducing poverty to less than 10 percent by 2035, and 
increasing the economic growth rate to 10 percent by 2017.9 It may seem incongruous to 
build a multi-million dollar Port complex in a country where many people lack access to 
clean water and adequate medical resources. Yet in theory these projects will attract 
foreign investment in those areas, provide funds to the government to serve the 
population, and give Cameroonians the skills needed to spearhead these projects 
domestically. This chain of events is intended to elevate Cameroon to middle-income 
country status by 2035.  
The Kribi Port is not set to open its berths until 2014, so it is impossible to determine 
the full extent of the impacts at this point. However, several micro-level impacts are 
already clear. Local populations are being displaced to make room for the Port, and 
though they are receiving compensation to relocate, many of them have protested that 
                                                 
7
 Revenue Watch Institute. “Cameroon: Country Data.” New York, NY. 2012.  
8
 Nsomotto, Daline-Louise. Personal Interview. 15 April 2013. Port office; Yaoundé SNI.  
9
 Cameroon Vision 2035. “Working Paper. Republic of Cameroon: Ministry of the Economy, 
Planning, and Regional Development.” 2009. p. 4.  
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they cannot adjust to life in a city, nor do they have the skills to find work there. This is 
particularly poignant in the case of the indigenous Bagyeli population, a forest dwelling 
people who have lived off hunting and gathering in the area for hundreds of years. A 
heavily traveled gravel construction road to the Port has been built right alongside a 
Bagyeli camp. They watch with interest as the trucks roll by, because they have not yet 
realized that the ever-increasing noise and pollution is driving out the animals that they 
rely on for their livelihood.10 Many fishermen in the area will also be forced to turn to 
other trades, and the biodiversity of the region, including the nearby Campo-Ma’an 
national park, will suffer.11 Kribi city is expected to become about five times larger than 
it currently is.12 With that comes increased crime, as well as a sense of anonymity that 
some long-time Kribi residents I spoke with have already begun to notice. 
After that introduction, it may seem that my mind is made up about the Port project. 
Yet the aspects discussed above are not the impacts this study examines in depth, because 
the negative impacts at the local and environmental level are already clear. With any 
huge undertaking like the Port, there will be upheaval in the local community, and things 
will be lost. Spending time with affected populations and hearing their stories would have 
been an incredible experience, but focusing on their stories alone would be ignoring the 
full story. Thus, my research focuses primarily on the macro-level economic impacts of 
the Port. The purpose of the inquiry was to determine whether the micro-level negatives 
are negligible when compared to the greater good that the Port will do for the country and 
the region. This is a question that has been largely unexplored, except in black and white 
                                                 
10
 Bagyeli Camp visit and discussion. 17 March 2013. Kribi.  
11
 Bove, Abel. Personal Interview. 20 March 2013. World Bank Yaoundé office.    
12
 Amougou. Interview. 22 April 2013.  
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terms by various promoters and detractors of the Port. This paper will attempt to offer a 
unbiased picture of how the Port will impact economic development in Cameroon.   
Research Questions & Hypotheses  
My initial research led me to focus my inquiry on two questions: 
1. Will the Kribi Deep Sea Port contribute positively to sustainable economic 
development in Cameroon?  
2. How will the Kribi Deep Sea Port project impact Cameroon’s trade relationships 
with CEMAC countries and foreign partners?  
Hypothesis 1: It will bring increased revenues to the state, and provide some 
employment, but ultimately will not create sustainable development. The Port project will 
focus the economy on sectors that are infamously corrupt and unsustainable, thus most 
Cameroonian citizens are unlikely to feel the effects of the revenues it generates.  
Hypothesis 2: Relationships among the CEMAC countries will be largely unchanged, 
because although they will all use the Port, the focus will be on exporting their goods 
abroad, not trading with one another. I think the Port will give China and the United 
States the opportunity to exploit Cameroonian resources, while contributing 
comparatively little to the domestic economy.   
II. Methodology 
Site & Subject Selection 
My site selection process was straightforward. It was important to spend time in 
both Kribi and Yaoundé, because it was crucial to see the actual construction site and 
speak to employees there. Yet given that the project is primarily directed from Yaoundé, 
it was equally important to talk to the relevant government agencies, embassies, NGOs, 
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and professors in the capital. Spending 2.5 weeks in Yaoundé and 1.5 weeks in Kribi 
gave me enough time to accomplish my goals in each area. My Yaoundé interviews took 
about 1.5 weeks, because there was minimal adjustment time given my previous 
familiarity with my homestay family, the city, and transportation. In Kribi, it took several 
days to orient myself and figure out logistics, followed by a week of interviews and 
observation. 
Subject selection was more complicated, and it was a process that continued 
throughout my research. My target population was people with knowledge and opinions 
relevant to the Kribi Port Project, which included individuals from a variety of fields. 
Using “expert” informants made my research more difficult in some respects but easier in 
others. On the negative side, it was often difficult to gain access to these people, as they 
had busy schedules and limited free time. Others were simply not interested in talking 
because they were worried about revealing privileged information to a researcher. It was 
sometimes difficult to establish rapport and gain trust because of the sensitive nature of 
the subject. On the other hand, these individuals had wealth of knowledge to share. Every 
participant had something relevant to say, and sometimes informants would go so far as 
to mentor me on how to conduct my research and frame my inquiry. They generally 
understood the nature of academic research, which also eased the interview process. 
Although there were occasionally difficulties of trust, with many informants I was able to 
develop great working relationships because of their interest in my research.  
Data Collection, Coding, & Reliability  
My data consisted of 20 interviews, 3 lectures, extensive secondary source 
research, and one day of observation at the Port site. These were the most effective tools 
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for me because my research questions did not lend themselves to surveys. My field 
research was primarily qualitative, but was complemented by more quantitative 
secondary source research. The informants consisted of 7 Cameroonian government 
employees, 3 embassy representatives, 3 NGO representatives, 3 corporate 
representatives, representatives of the IMF and the World Bank, a Port construction 
worker, and a professor of politics. Only one of these, a Cameroonian ministry worker, 
was a woman. Only in a few cases did informants permit me to record interviews, so 
instead I took extensive notes as they spoke. The data is reliable because the research was 
based on a combination of opinions and perceptions, which do not need to be checked. 
Any facts given were crosschecked with secondary sources.  
The interviews were stored by category (Government, NGO, Corporate, etc.) in 
my electronic research journal. Following that, each interview was analyzed to extract 
important themes and make observations. The themes and observations were noted in a 
separate section of the research journal. There were many recurring themes, which made 
coding a straightforward process. The data lent itself naturally to analysis, because unlike 
raw numbers or survey responses, it was in the form of personal analysis of the subject 
done by my informants. My role was to link these ideas with secondary sources to form a 
coherent narrative, and finally to analyze that narrative. 
Strengths & Limitations of my Research  
One limitation of my research was time. There are many stakeholders in the Kribi 
Port Project whose insights are not included here. However, given the patterns present in 
the responses, it is possible to predict what those additional informants may have 
contributed. The more significant limitation of my project was the lack of access to 
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sensitive information about the Port, because it is such an important project for the 
government. Due to my major ethical concern – misrepresenting the nature of my 
research – participants were always informed of my doubts concerning the efficacy of 
Kribi Port project. Although this was necessary because ethical research was of primary 
importance in this study, it limited what some informants were willing to share. My final 
limitation was language. When interviews were conducted in French, it was sometimes 
difficult to formulate questions about the complicated issues the paper addresses. Thus, 
responses did not always correspond to the intended question. This was not a huge 
obstacle, because it was usually possible to rephrase the question in a comprehensible 
manner.  
Overall, the strengths of my research were more significant than the limitations. 
The first factor that contributed to my success was that the majority of my interviews 
were conducted in English. It was easier and more efficient to analyze information given 
in English than in French. The supportive and work-conducive environments in both of 
my host families also contributed immeasurably to my success. My host parents in 
Yaoundé gave me rides to the ministries in the morning, and helped me locate elusive 
government offices. My host mother in Kribi was very well connected in the government 
and NGO community, and exposed me to obscure and valuable sources. Finally, several 
informants were extremely helpful, and went above and beyond what was asked of them. 
Several people sent me relevant articles after interviews for further reference, suggested 
other possible contacts, and offered to respond to further questions via email. This 
superlative level of cooperation made the research process much easier and more 
enjoyable.   
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III. Stakeholders and Expectations  
The original idea for the Kribi Port Complex was born under the leadership of 
Ahidjo, between 1980 and 1982. It remained a peripheral goal for the government until 
2005, when the idea was brought to the fore and feasibility studies began. Finally, in 
2008 the funding was secured from ExIm Bank, and after almost thirty years the project 
became tangible.13 The success of the Cameroon Vision 2035 goals hinges directly on the 
success of the Port, which is seen as the linchpin in the government’s effort to develop 
Cameroonian infrastructure. Now, as the Port’s projected 2014 opening date nears, the 
“selling” stage is in full swing. A round table investment summit is planned for June of 
this year, and intended guests include ambassadors and corporate representatives from all 
the major Western powers, as well as China and neighboring CEMAC countries. The 
expectation is that many parties will be vying for the rights to undertake the infrastructure 
projects like the roads and light rail intended to surround the Port. The coordinators also 
believe that foreign companies will invest in industrial projects in the vicinity of the Port, 
in sectors as diverse as agricultural and electricity. The vision for the Port is not as a 
simple entry and exit point for goods, but as a global trade hub, and a new city that will 
surpass Douala as the economic capital of the country by 2040.14 
When asked how the Kribi Port would be a positive step for the economic 
development, the first thing that nearly all of my informants mentioned was the minimal 
capacity of the Port of Douala. Those who believe that foreign investment will catalyze 
economic growth in Cameroon see the lack of a deep-water port as a major impediment 
                                                 
13
 Nsomotto. Interview. 15 April 2013.   
14
 Idem.  
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to development.15 A director in the Ministry of Commerce explained that Cameroon 
hopes to replicate the experience of the East Asian “Tigers,” whose maritime-based trade 
helped lift them from poverty. Many also cited the fact that the Port will serve an 
important purpose for the CEMAC region, particularly for landlocked countries like Chad 
and the Central African Republic who need a means of exporting their plentiful raw 
materials. Cameroon is the most politically stable country in the region, and the de facto 
leader of the CEMAC regional organization. Stakeholders hope that the Port will cement 
Cameroon’s leadership role in the region, while bringing investment and positive 
externalities to its neighbors as well.  
The Port Direction committee hopes that foreign partners will recognize the vast 
potential of Kribi as an industrial city, which will generate competition among investors, 
and lead to favorable terms of investment.16 Terms of investment are a key issue in 
economic development, and according to a representative in the Yaoundé IMF office, 
poorly negotiated terms of trade and investment have been responsible for much of the 
economic stagnancy in Cameroon and across Sub-Saharan Africa. The IMF encourages 
the government to engage in fastidious cost-benefit analysis before undertaking big 
projects with any partners.17 If the draw of the Port can improve Cameroon’s bargaining 
capacity with foreign partners, it will serve an important purpose. The Port Direction 
Committee also reports that any investments in infrastructure projects surrounding the 
Port will be required to be joint ventures with Cameroonian companies.18 It is unclear 
how this will transpire given the lack of large-scale enterprise in Cameroon, but joint 
                                                 
15
 Mbanga, Valentin. Personal Interview. April 2013. Ministry of Commerce Yaoundé office.   
16
 Nsomotto. Interview. 15 April 2013.  
17
 IMF anonymous representative. Personal Interview. 16 April 2013. IMF Yaoundé office.  
18
 Nsomotto. Interview. 15 April 2013.  
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ventures would be a good way to ensure that some revenues stay in the country and a 
transfer of technology takes place. Currently the majority of Cameroonian enterprise is 
low-skill, low value-added, and in 2005 less than 10% of exports were manufactured 
goods. According to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 
the best way to remedy Cameroon’s negative progress in export performance over the 
past several years is through foreign direct investment, which the Port will promote.19  
The Cameroonian economy consists of nine principal sectors that contribute to its 
GDP: manufacturing, tourism, industry, energy, services, mining, finance, timber, and 
agriculture. In order to analyze the cumulative effects that the Port will have on economic 
development in Cameroon, one needs to identify which sectors the Port project will have 
a measurable effect on. The five sectors that will be most directly affected are Mining, 
Energy, Manufacturing, Industry, and Tourism. In the following sections I will delineate 
how these sectors will be affected, and analyze whether those effects will contribute 
positively or negatively to sustainable economic development.   
IV. Mining Impacts   
The Port will impact the mining sector on every level. The Kribi port is designed 
as primarily a mineral Port, and there is a terminal specifically for raw minerals, as well 
as terminals for aluminum and iron.20 This will reduce costs at every level for importers 
and exporters of Cameroonian minerals, encouraging investment in Cameroon’s rich 
natural resources.21 Mining currently accounts for only two percent of Cameroon’s GDP, 
but many companies are in the early stages of their projects and are just beginning the 
                                                 
19
 United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Industrial Performance and Capabilities 
of Cameroon: Analysis of the Industrial Sector. December 2005. p. 6.  
20
 Amougou. Interview. 22 April 2013.   
21
 Mamadou. Personal Interview. 11 April 2013. United States Embassy Yaoundé.    
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extraction phase, so this percentage is expected to increase considerably in the coming 
years. 22  An executive with GeoVic, an American company working in Cameroon, 
asserted that the uptick in mining investment has little to do with the Port, and is based on 
when they discover minerals and find the investors to starts projects.23 Yet even if cause-
and-effect is not directly distinguishable, they Port is clearly linked to the mining 
industry. Two men I spoke to at the Ministry of Mines noted that the Port has been 
crucial in encouraging foreign investment in Cameroonian natural resources, and the 
number of companies that have come to invest in mining projects in Cameroon has 
increased substantially since the Port began construction.24  
 This new foreign investment means that the Port will augment revenues in the 
mining sector, and increase the percentage of GDP that mining accounts for. This means 
an increase in revenues for the state, which typically receives twenty percent of the 
mining revenues generated in Cameroon, through taxation and their shares in private 
companies.25 Mining revenues will certainly benefit the state, but the question remains 
whether or not the mining industry is a good way to promote sustainable economic 
development in Cameroon. When I posed this question to a GeoVic executive at the 
Yaoundé office, he laughed quietly and did not respond affirmatively. Instead, he 
answered with suggestions for how the industry could be improved to make it more 
beneficial to the country. He pointed out that the industry is almost exclusively foreign-
controlled, and there are few Cameroonians who have the expertise to work in mining.26 
While his response was telling, to gain a general understanding of the economic 
                                                 
22
 Revenue Watch Institute. “Cameroon Country Data.” 2012.   
23
 GeoVic anonymous director. Personal Interview. 11 April 2013. GeoVic Yaoundé office.   
24
 MINMIDT anonymous 1. Personal Interview. 8 April 2013. Ministry of Mines Yaoundé.   
25
 GeoVic. Interview. 11 April 2013.  
26
 GeoVic. Interview. 11 April 2013.  
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development impacts one has to examine three categories: sustainability, employment 
opportunities, and revenue destinations.  
By their very nature the extractive industries are not sustainable – eventually, 
natural resources in Cameroon will run out. Thus, sustainability in the mining sector is 
based on the government’s aptitude in long-term financial planning. Revenues need to be 
reinvested in sustainable development projects in order for mining to contribute to the 
long-term economic development of the country. Although it is impossible to predict how 
the revenues will be used, based on previous problems with transparency in the extractive 
industries in Cameroon there is reason to doubt that revenues will be saved or invested in 
development projects. Money from mining contracts has often been misappropriated in 
the past, at both the government and corporate level.27  
Cameroon also has notoriously poor communication between ministries, which 
makes long term planning difficult. 28  I was told by a director in the Ministry of 
Commerce that the Ministry of finance would handle mining revenues, but no one in that 
ministry or on the corporate side could tell me how they determine spending priorities for 
extractive industry revenues. The lack of communication and transparency in the 
government is also an obstacle to the success of the mining sector because of the 
resulting issues with overlapping land-use permits. Almost every company dealing with 
natural resources in Cameroon has to deal with competing land claims at some point. 
This is an obstacle that the government should have addressed before the construction of 
                                                 
27
 Bisil, Eric. CED environmentalist. Lecture. 21 March 2013. SIT office Yaoundé.  
28
 Schwartz, Brendan & Hoyle, David. “Emerging trends in land use conflicts in Cameroon: 
Overlapping natural resource permits threaten protected areas and foreign direct 
investment.” CED, WWF. April 2012. p. 9.   
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the Port, because it will continue to limit the attractiveness of investing in Cameroon, 
despite the convenience of the Port.29 
Finally, mining is an industry that is foreign controlled on every level. According 
to the executive I spoke with at GeoVic, 50 to 60 percent of revenues ultimately leave 
Cameroon. They go back to investors in countries like the United States and Australia, 
who are certainly not spending that money in Cameroon. More importantly, mining is 
also foreign-dominated in that it employs relatively few Cameroonians, even as compared 
to other foreign-controlled industries. While some African countries have legislated for 
minimum levels of local participation in foreign companies, Cameroon is not among 
them.30 Women in particular are completely shut out of the industry, which is detrimental 
for a country that is purportedly trying to better utilize the capacity of the female work 
force.31 The lack of domestic involvement is a significant problem with the industry, 
according to the director of GeoVic, a rare Cameroonian for whom mining has provided a 
reliable income. He proposes that foreign-owned companies should be required to 
contribute to the formation of mining schools in Cameroon, such as the one currently 
being formed in Northern Cameroon. He says that the major problem with mining is that 
Cameroon lacks engineers that can do skilled work for these companies, let alone start 
their own enterprises.32  
Thus, it seems that as long as the extractive industries are foreign and state 
controlled, they will be neither sustainable, nor good for job creation. The African 
                                                 
29
 GeoVic. Interview. 11 April 2013.   
30
 Moyo, Dambisa. (2009). Dead Aid. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux. p. 145.   
31
 International Monetary Fund. IMF Concludes 2012 Article IV consultation with Cameroon. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2012/pn1283.htm  
            Public Information Notice 12/83. 19 July 2012.  
32
 GeoVic. Interview. 11 April 2013.  
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Development Bank has noted that the primary commodity and extractive industries “are 
not generating the employment opportunities that would allow the majority of the 
population to share in the benefits…This is in marked contrast to the Asian experience, 
where the growth of labor-intensive manufacturing has helped lift millions of people out 
of poverty.”33 As long as minerals are not transformed in Cameroon, the employment 
opportunities that the mining sector generates will be minimal. Although the Vision 2035 
goals involve expanding the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, there is no 
indication that they have taken steps to develop the skilled workforce and attract the 
investment that mineral transformation requires.34  
V. Energy, Manufacturing, Industry, and Tourism Impacts     
As another branch of the extractive industries, the energy sector faces similar 
corruption issues. The Cameroonian national oil refining company SNH is controlled 
directly by the executive branch, and is notorious for its lack of transparency.35  Oil 
companies in Cameroon are joint ventures between foreign companies and the state-
owned company SONARA. Independently, Cameroon still lacks the ability to add value 
to a significant percentage of their raw crude oil. An example of an obstacle to domestic 
transformation is the SONARA oil refining plant, built in 1973 in Limbe. It currently 
functions at ten percent of capacity, because the refinery was constructed for a type of oil 
that Cameroon does not actually have very much of. This means they have to import oil 
in order to refine it – not an efficient business model.36 Thus, it continues to be the 
                                                 
33
 Sanusi, Lamido. “Africa must get real about Chinese ties.” Financial Times. 3 April 2013. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2NKPcieuI. 
34
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foreign-operated companies that dominate the oil sector. According to the U.S. embassy, 
the presence of the Kribi Port will encourage United States investors to look more closely 
at Sub-Saharan Africa as a source of oil. Currently U.S. companies remain hesitant about 
Sub-Saharan Africa, while they invest heavily in the Middle East and other regions. The 
presence of the Port will encourage them to give Cameroon and the entire CEMAC 
region a second look.37 Yet the foreign power who will most obviously benefit from the 
Port project is France. Plans have already been made for an industrial park in which the 
French company GDF-Suez will work with collaborate with SNH to transform natural 
gas into liquefied gas for export. There will be an entire terminal devoted to the export of 
liquefied gas, and the government is expecting this project to generate significant 
revenue.38 
These Port-based projects will contribute to the economic development of the 
country, in that growth in the oil sector will bring increased revenues to the state. Oil 
production expanded by about nine percent in 2012, due to significant exploration and 
increased exploitation of oil resources. Private operators were responsible for the 
majority of this increased production. However, the main drivers of economic growth 
over the past several years have been in the non-oil economy. Growth in the tertiary 
sector is actually estimated to have contributed the most to the expansion of economic 
activity. 39  Additionally, the oil industry suffers from the two main problems of the 
mining industry; it creates few new jobs compared to secondary and tertiary level 
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industries, and lacks transparency.40 The revenues from oil go straight to the coffers of 
the executive branch, and from there are exceedingly difficult to trace. 41  Creating 
employment is a major priority for Cameroon at this point, so it is important to diversify 
and invest in high-employment industries alongside the low-employment industries like 
mining and oil.42   
The manufacturing sector will also be affected by the development of the Kribi 
Port Complex, but in a slightly different way. One important goal of Vision 2035 is for 
manufacturing to eventually account for 23 percent of GDP compared to the current 11 
percent.43 Yet the most direct effect on manufacturing will be the influx of cheap goods 
from abroad. Several ministry representatives pointed out how lowered transaction costs 
would lower the costs of imported goods, and thus increase imports. They cited this as a 
benefit of the Port, and a way to lower the cost of living in the country.44 Yet there are 
negative side effects of cheap imports, which can already be seen to some extent with the 
flood of Chinese goods into Cameroon.45  First, as many informants pointed out, the 
goods coming into the market are low quality, because China maintains different 
standards of production for different export markets.46 Cameroonians frequently refer to 
something as “Chinese” to insult its quality.  
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The second problem is that these goods are sold so cheaply that domestic 
Cameroonian manufacturers are put out of business, unable to compete with Chinese 
prices. Thus, increased imports will further inhibit Cameroon from developing a diverse 
manufacturing base, which is essential to sustainable economic development.47 It is worth 
noting that output, employment, and investment in Cameroon all grew more during the 
protectionism phase than the liberalization phase. The United Nations Industrial 
Organization currently cites competition from imports, weaknesses in output, and 
technology acquisition as three major obstacles to Cameroon’s economic success. In 
2005, less than ten percent of Cameroon’s exports were manufactured goods.48 While I 
am not advocating that Cameroon turn it’s back on the global economy, it does seem 
worthwhile for the government to further explore import-substitution possibilities, which 
the Port will not promote.  
The fourth affected sector is industry – the most obviously linked to the Kribi Port 
Complex, which will be an industrial park if all goes as planned. The Port will facilitate 
rapid industrialization if the plans for the surrounding infrastructure projects are realized. 
The master plan for the Port includes almost every industrial sector than currently exists 
in the country, including agro-industry and electricity. Some of these types of 
industrialization are more beneficial than others, and ministry representatives in the 
Ministry of Mines expressed their hope that the Port would draw in foreign investment in 
agro-industry. If this were to happen it could create significant employment opportunities 
for Cameroonians, because agro-businesses typically employ more Cameroonians than 
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the extractive industries.49 Ultimately, the Port will support the development of industry 
in Cameroon, and the percentage of GDP that industry creates will increase.50 This will 
be a positive thing for the country if it comes with a transfer of technology and 
employment opportunities.  
The final affected industry is tourism. Although this is a local level effect, it is 
relevant to the national economy because Kribi is one of the most important tourist 
destinations in the country. The Port will have significant transformative effects on the 
area, planned and unplanned. Kribi and Campo, the towns on either side of the Port, are 
projected to grow to about five times their current sizes.51 The Southern Regional director 
of the Ministry of Tourism reported that he expects the tourism industry to grow as a 
result of the Port’s presence, with the influx of people and international hotel chains. He 
explained that the major obstacle to attracting foreign tourists to Kribi is the lack of 
world-class hotels. Instead there are many small hotels that do not meet Western 
standards.  
However, he also emphasized ecotourism as the future of tourism in the region. 
He explained that they are in the process of establishing host structures in villages and 
Bagyeli camps so that tourists can experience traditional life.52  This is problematic, 
because the Port is in fact displacing many of these local people and destroying their 
villages. The Port will certainly bring in more people, more money, and thus more need 
for leisure activities. Tourism will increase, but it is not likely to be in the ecotourism 
                                                 
49
 IMF anonymous representative. Interview. 16 April 2013.  
50
 Mamadou. Interview. 11 April 2013.  
51
 Amougou. Interview. 22 April 2013.  
52
 Minister of Tourism: Southern region. Personal Interview. 23 April 2013. Ministry of Tourism, 
Kribi.    
 23 
direction.53 Statistics released by the ministry of economy show that 5,000 people have 
already been forced from their homes, and according to the current plan the Port complex 
will use at least 27,000 hectares of forestland. This is not only an environmental but also 
an economic impact, because as one of Kribi’s two mayors Sabikanda Guy Emmanuel 
pointed out “the disappearance of our forest means losing out on an important part of 
revenue from logging for our council budget, especially in the short run, and this is quite 
disturbing.”54 The goal of ecotourism is to mitigate the impacts of tourism on the land 
and local people, while the presence of the Port will increase the impacts on the land and 
the people. Additionally, to date no official environmental impact assessment has been 
done, because of the government’s desire to start the project as quickly as possible.55 
Environmentalist Eric Bisil of the CED pointed out that this fact alone could support the 
argument that it is too early for the Port project to be undertaken.56 
V. Effects on CEMAC  
When addressing the economic development effects of the Kribi Port on the CEMAC 
regional group, I have to qualify my analysis by explaining my view on regional 
economic groups. I believe that developing countries should adhere to the structuralist 
theory of how to equalize North-South trade. This would involve instituting higher tariffs 
while they develop the weak areas of their economies. This kind of import-substituting 
development, along with increased intra- regional trade, is the best solution to their 
current inability to compete on the global market. Instead of competing with the highly 
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subsidized farmers and cheap imports from abroad, they would be competing and trading 
with their neighbors who have more similar means of production and government 
funding. Developing countries that have already increased intraregional trade through 
successful agreements are faring better with free trade than their counterparts who rely on 
Northern markets.57 This theory is in line with what Kenichi Ohmae posits in “The End 
of the Nation State,” where he writes that the focus of economic development should be 
shifted “away from nations and back toward regions.”58 However, I am not alone in 
placing great importance on regional trade. The Vision 2035 goals also note the 
importance of increased regional and sub-regional exchange.59 
CEMAC is already a well-integrated regional group in some ways, given that they 
share a common currency and a central bank (BEAC). The principal challenges to further 
integration are posed by the instability and poverty that are present in several member 
states, notably Chad and the Central African Republic. This leads to a lack of 
infrastructure in those states that inhibits intraregional exchange.60 The Kribi Port will be 
an important addition to the infrastructure of all CEMAC countries, because they will all 
use it. Even nearby Equatorial Guinea, who does not currently use the Port of Douala, has 
sent an emissary to look into securing access to the Deep Sea Port. These countries will 
benefit from easier access to foreign markets via the Port, particularly in the case of 
landlocked CEMAC member states like Chad and the CAR. This will raise the global 
profile of the CEMAC region, and create new trade relationships between member states 
and foreign partners. However, because the Port will emphasize global connections and 
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raw material exports, it may direct attention away from regional exchange. This would 
continue the current economic trend in the region, of increasing dependence on mineral 
exports and decreasing capacity to export industrial products.61 However according the 
US embassy representative this is not necessarily a bad thing, because it is important to 
maintain diverse trade strategies.62 
 The most significant positive regional effect of the Port is the potential positive 
externalities that it may bring. While these cannot be predicated with complete accuracy, 
one can look to history to extrapolate how things may unfold. One important example is 
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline. There were many clear drawbacks to this project, but one 
positive outcome is often overlooked: the construction of a high bandwidth fiber-optic 
cable that runs along the Pipeline, giving Chad internet access to a degree that would 
have been impossible otherwise, and linking Chad to Cameroon.63 As I mentioned, one of 
the biggest challenges facing CEMAC is the lack of intraregional transportation 
infrastructure. Roads and railways will likely be built in order for countries to transport 
their goods to the Kribi Port, because foreign companies will be willing to invest in 
infrastructure to increase trade efficiency.64 Although the goal of these routes will be to 
transport goods for export, these new transport routes could also potentially increase 
intraregional trade and connections, which would be very beneficial to the Cameroonian 
economy.  
 Finally, the access to a world-class seaport will potentially allow the CEMAC 
countries to boost their economies through foreign investment and create new 
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employment. One thing that some scholars criticize about CEMAC is that the region 
lacks free movement of labor. However, this is a case where an economic principle that 
applies to many regions does not make sense. With huge unemployment rates in most 
CEMAC countries, it is naïve to expect that allowing jobless people into other countries 
that lack jobs would stimulate the economy. However, if the Port can encourage 
investment and employment in Cameroon’s neighbors, it could boost their economies 
enough so that eventually free flow of labor in CEMAC may be a viable option. This 
would strengthen the regional economy in a sustainable manner. Ultimately, the potential 
benefits to the CEMAC region are some of the most important benefits that the Port will 
bring, if they are harnessed effectively.  
VI. The Cameroon – China Partnership  
The Kribi Port Complex will impact Cameroon’s relationships with its foreign 
partners, namely China, France, and the United States. They question is, do their interests 
align with Cameroon to create truly “gagnant-gagnant” partnerships? Or is there a point 
at which the interests of these industrial giants are at odds with those of Cameroon; a 
country where human development indicators have remained largely stagnant despite 
decades of aid and investment from the West. Representatives from all three governments 
have confirmed that the Kribi Port will promote greater involvement between Cameroon 
and these countries, but the partner mostly directly linked to the project is China.  
China has a clear stake in the Port and what it will bring for their relationship, 
because it is a Chinese state-owned company that designed and built the Port.65 They also 
have a long trading history with Cameroon. In 2002, the Agreement for Economic and 
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Commercial Cooperation codified the existing preferential trade relationship between 
Cameroon and China. The volume of trade between them had been steadily increasing 
since 1995, but rose markedly after the 2002 agreement and shot up to a new level in 
2008 when Cameroon began exporting more oil to China. Their trade relationship is 
reminiscent of colonialism in that Cameroon exports raw materials like oil, wood, and 
cotton, and imports primarily manufactured goods such as vehicles, clothing, and leather 
products. 66  China’s significant investment in Africa is part of their “going global” 
strategy, which began in 1988 when they started establishing special economic zones 
around the world, after 20 years of focusing on bringing foreign investment into China. 
The goal was to find new markets for Chinese goods and services, gain access to raw 
materials, and increase their global political power.67 African countries comprise a large 
voting bloc in settings like the United Nations, which makes them beneficial allies for 
China. A secondary goal of “going global” was to circumvent the restrictions that some 
states have on Chinese exports by producing goods in other countries and exporting from 
there. These economic benefits are part of the reason why China has “generously” 
cancelled 66 million USD of Cameroonian debt to China over the past 15 years.68  
The question of why countries like Cameroon accept this seemingly colonial trade 
relationship has a fairly straightforward answer. Unlike the Western states and 
organizations that offer conditional aid and investment, China does not care about the 
political practices of its trading partners. This makes it a perfect trading partner for 
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autocratic presidents like Paul Biya, who are looking to legitimize their regimes through 
mega-projects that China is willing to finance. Biya can justify the partnership to the 
public because it has socio-historical roots. Whereas Western involvement in the 
continent is often seen as neo-colonial and paternalistic, China refers to itself as “the 
world’s largest developing country”69 and has never tried to impose cultural or political 
norms on African states. China even helped finance some of the nationalist wars of 
liberation in the 1960s.70  
Given the history of their relationship, the fact that China was invited to construct 
the Kribi Port Complex is not surprising. However, what is more interesting is that 
France was originally intended to provide the funds, and a French company was set to 
design the Port. A French company had even drawn up initial plans for the Port – 
Cameroon was willing to put aside any resentment of their former colonizer to 
collaborate on the project. However, all of this changed with the global financial crisis in 
2008. Almost overnight, it became very difficult to procure funds in the Western world. 
France had to back out of the project, leaving Cameroon to turn to China, who remained 
largely unscathed by the financial collapse. China was eager to step in. Cameroon 
negotiated a 207 billion CFA concessionary loan with the Export-Import (Exim) Bank for 
the project, and the bank designated CHEC, a state-owned company, for the design and 
construction of the Port. 
This begs the question: given the history of China’s presence in Cameroon, how 
will their increasing links with the country impact sustainable economic development? 
According to the Chinese embassy in Cameroon, the Port will not directly affect their 
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trade relationship, except by making it easier for Cameroon to export commodities. As 
the representative pointed out, they are already engaged in a high level of trade, even 
without the Port, and they plan to continue to exchange the same types of goods. The 
significant change in their relationship will not be in terms of trade, but in the level of 
Chinese involvement and investment in Cameroonian infrastructure. The embassy 
confirmed that the same company who is building the port, CHEC, hopes to win the 
contract to manage the Port, as well as to build the roads and railways that are planned to 
link it to major cities and extraction sites. If China succeeds in securing these contracts, 
they will far surpass any other investor in their level of investment in Cameroon.71 These 
investments will certainly contribute to the creation of more sophisticated infrastructure 
in Cameroon, which will contribute to the country’s “Doing Business” ranking, 
something several informants mentioned as an important consequence of the Port.72 
Many people I spoke to, from Cameroonian bureaucrats to corporate 
representatives, have pointed out that just like any trade partner, China is driven by it’s 
own interests. It would be a mistake to perceive their relationship with Cameroon as 
anything like a friendship.73 So what makes this trade relationship better or worse than 
any other? First, China is notorious for bringing in their own workers for their projects 
abroad. The Chinese embassy representative responded to this by saying that while they 
were doing their utmost to hire more Cameroonians, the lack of skilled labor in 
Cameroon often hindered their efforts.74 This means that very little transfer of technology 
takes place, which the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
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representative cited as one of the most important factors in promoting sustainable 
economic development. While Cameroon needs financial investment, he pointed out that 
what are more important are long-term technological investments.75 History suggests that 
the Chinese are not going to be the ones to do this. An article in the China Daily pointed 
out that a benefit of doing business in Cameroon is that they have “an investment charter 
that allows investors to repatriate profits.”76 In this case, it appears that China intends to 
repatriate both the literal and figurative profits. Not only will they earn direct revenues 
from their projects, but their workforce will also gain skills and experience that they can 
bring back to China. According to Lamido Sanusi, governor of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, China is “a significant contributor to Africa’s deindustrialization and 
underdevelopment,” and Africa “must encourage a shift from consuming Chinese-made 
goods to making and consuming our own.”77 For Cameroon, the ultimate goal of foreign 
investment is for Cameroonians to eventually gain the skills and technology needed to 
coordinate something like the Kribi Port project domestically; it is worth noting that this 
remains a distant dream despite over a decade of heavy Chinese investment in the 
country.78  
VII. Personal Analysis and Predictions  
As readers may have ascertained, I have many reservations about the Kribi Deep Sea 
Port project. The project first appeared to be a demonstration and reinforcement of 
President Paul Biya’s personal power. The Port is being built in the region where he 
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holds the most power,79 and his face is all over the “grands realisations” posters in every 
ministry. It is no doubt an impressive feat orchestrating the construction of a multi-
million dollar Port, thus it seemed like a natural tool to reinforce his power. Yet it has 
become clear that it is much more than that. In fact, almost all my informants at every 
level – government, corporate, and NGO – believe that it will be a positive step for the 
economy. There will certainly be economic benefits for many actors involved. However, 
I believe the project has been undertaken prematurely. It strikes me as an example of 
Rene Dumond’s argument in his book L’Afrique noir est mal parti: a developing country 
skipping the necessary steps of development and moving straight to large-scale 
industrialization. There as several development steps that need to be taken in Cameroon 
before the full benefits of a project like the Port can be reaped. Under the current 
circumstances, the natural resource wealth of Cameroon will be used up before there are 
mechanisms in place to ensure that its benefits go to the Cameroonian people.  
The first obstacle is the lack of an adequately educated workforce. Engineers, doctors, 
and scientists are in short supply in Cameroon, and these are the professions that drive 
industry. The Port project will bring in foreign investment and foreign companies that 
will theoretically engage in joint ventures with Cameroonians, but it is unclear how this 
will be logistically possible given the lack of Cameroonians available to fulfill roles 
requiring technical skills. Cameroon currently ranks 63rd of a list of 74 developing 
countries in terms of the intensity of technical skill development in the country. In the 
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same sample they rank in the bottom ten countries in the percentage of their industries 
that are medium or high tech as opposed to resource-based. 80  
Even the Kribi Port project steering committee admitted that at least in the first few 
years, the lack of skilled Cameroonian workers would be a problem. Their belief is that 
the government will realize this problem and invest in educational infrastructure, and 
high-tech skill creation in particular.81 Yet even if this is the case, this is evidence of the 
premature nature of the project; it will create jobs before there are workers who can fill 
them. Economist Dambisa Moyo notes that foreign direct investors looking to have a 
long term presence in a country seek out governments that are “keen on investing in their 
infrastructure…notably education.” 82  Thus, the lack of initiative the government has 
shown in the area of education could even deter the foreign investment that the Port is 
meant to attract. As far as the assertion that the government will address the problem of 
inadequate education structures, one informant pointed out that the Port project was 
conceived of over 30 years ago, in which time the government could have, but has not, 
put in place any measures to increase professional skill creation.83 
 The lack of educated Cameroonians to fill these professional jobs is detrimental at 
two levels. Not only do Cameroonians miss out on employment opportunities, but it 
means that companies will have to bring in workers from abroad. These skilled 
professionals will come with purchasing power, leading prices for basic commodities to 
increase.84 Several ministry workers cited a reduced cost of living as a positive impact of 
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the Port, because of the associated reduction in import costs.85 Yet due to the negative 
externality associated with the influx of foreign labor, the Port may have the opposite 
effect. Rather than making goods affordable, it will further the divide between those who 
can keep up with the increase in prices and those who cannot. The rich and educated 
population will get richer and benefit from new jobs, while the uneducated will be 
excluded from the economy – what amounts to a condemnation of the poor.86 
The second reason why the Port is a premature project is that the inconvenience of 
having a sub-optimal Port is not as significant as many of the economic development 
challenges in Cameroon. Business executives operating in Cameroon, both Cameroonian 
and foreign, tend to agree. In a 2010 study, executives were asked to make a list of the 
most important obstacles to doing business in the country. The four most commonly 
listed were fiscal regulation (59%), corruption (50%), access to credit (38%), and 
administrative formalities (36%). Transportation and infrastructure were both listed by 
less than twenty percent of respondents.87 This suggests that the Port, which is designed 
to benefit corporate interests, does not actually address their current priorities. 
Additionally, in a 2009 study on obstacles to doing business, executives from the mining 
and oil sectors cited the fewest number of obstacles, and the greatest ease of operations.88 
It appears that they are already faring better in the country than other enterprises already, 
yet they are the ones who will reap the majority of the benefits from this project.  
My third hesitation is that the Port will not encourage diversification, both in terms of 
trade relationships and domestic economic development. Investing so much in the 
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relationship with China is risky, because according to the World Bank there is a 
possibility of an abrupt downturn in Chinese demand and “a disorderly unwinding of 
China’s unusually high investment rate.” If CHEC does, as they expect to, win the 
contracts for developing the infrastructure for the entire Port Industrial Complex, 
Cameroon will be hugely indebted and indelibly linked to China. If China suddenly 
demands the repayment of a loan, or even stops forgiving loans to Cameroon as regularly 
as it has in the past, it could be a huge blow to Cameroon. These problems are not only 
specific to China – agreeing to long term spending commitments is a risky endeavor for a 
commodity-exporting country like Cameroon, given the volatility of the global market.   
The specific problem with the Chinese partnership is the lack of transfer of 
technology. Even if my informants had not raised this issue time and time again, it would 
have been apparent to me upon visiting the Port worksite. The evidence of segregation 
was glaring. On one side of the construction site, there are the Chinese dorms. In this area 
there is a soccer field, basketball courts, and roughly an acre devoted to the growing of 
Chinese produce. The signage was almost exclusively in Chinese. On the other side of the 
site, there are the dorms for the Cameroonian workers. They do not eat in the Chinese 
cafeteria, and frequent small bars and roadside establishments instead. Several workers 
reported in informal conversations that they rarely talk to the Chinese workers, even at 
work. They explained that they have different responsibilities, the Chinese working every 
day, while the Cameroonians are called in for physical labor. When asked if they had 
learned any skills or understood how the project was being directed, they replied that they 
learned how to operate some different machinery but were not privy to the details of the 
project. One expressed the belief that after the Port was completed, the Chinese would 
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leave and Cameroonians would run it.89  I did not correct him, but according to the 
Cameroonian government this will not be the case. When their two-year contract 
expires,90 these laborers will have to start again from square one. Economist Dambisa 
Moyo, along with many others, cites job creation and technology transfer as the two 
biggest benefits of foreign direct investment. 91  In their relationship with China, 
Cameroon is not deriving either of these benefits.  
Finally, the most significant reason why the Port is a premature project will come as 
no surprise to anyone familiar with Cameroonian politics: the lack of transparency. My 
government contacts unfailingly referred me to some other ministry or individual when 
asked how Port revenues would be used to promote the development of the country. 
When asked whether corruption would be a problem with the new influx of revenues to 
state, their replies ranged from laughter to explanations of how corruption was being 
combatted. No one offered a hint of where the money was headed, and no one assured me 
that this time it would get there. Cameroon has never suffered particularly economically, 
and GDP has been growing steadily over the past five years (if not quite as fast as other 
oil-producing nations). The figures that remain startlingly stagnant are the human 
development indicators, which have never corresponded to national income.92  
It is commonly accepted that corruption is to blame. Public health is a good example. 
Cameroon spends USD 61 per capita per year on health, yet has the indicators of a 
country spending around USD 10 to 15 per capita per year. In a 2009 budget-tracking 
exercise by the World Bank, they found that 35-40 percent of funds allocated for local 
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health units never reached their intended recipients. These are disheartening figures, and 
no amount of natural resource extraction and exportation can create honest politicians. 
The incredible centralization of the state, combined with a weak system of checks and 
balances, makes it easy to skim money off the top. The administration lacks the capacity 
to regulate and monitor mining activities, and no system for tracing mining revenues 
currently exists.93 The danger of the Port is that bringing in all this foreign investment 
now means that resource wealth may be exhausted whilst Cameroon still suffers from 
rampant corruption, and Cameroon will be left with nothing to show for its natural gifts. 
Even if direct embezzlement does not take place, the lack of bureaucratic 
transparency means that ministries are not required to publicly specify where funds are 
going, or create long-term spending plans. This is of the utmost importance with revenues 
from natural resources. Yet the kind of collaboration that responsible financial planning 
requires has not been demonstrated by the Cameroonian government. Even among those 
working in ministries, there is a sense of apathy about the destination of the revenues 
from Port-related projects. When asked about what the revenues might be used for, two 
young men in the ministry of Mines indicated that they would not see any impacts 
because they were too low in the bureaucratic hierarchy.94  Another informant in the 
Regional Commerce ministry in Kribi indicated that he had very little information about 
the Port and how it might impact the local economy or local development.95 These were 
striking comments, and led me to wonder, if these men working in the government will 
not feel the effects of the revenues, how will the 30 percent of Cameroonians living in 
poverty feel the effects? In my opinion, it is too early to undertake a project like this 
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when the only visible changes one can expect are a few more Prados appearing in the 
driveways of recently constructed mansions. 
IX. Conclusion  
The Kribi Deep Sea Port and resulting investments will inject more money into the 
Cameroonian economy, and create new opportunities for employment and regional 
integration. These are positive impacts, and the project is not ill conceived. For many 
countries it would be extremely beneficial, and if the development of the relevant sectors 
is handled efficiently and transparently, the government increases education funding to 
prepare more Cameroonians for professional employment, and the increasing regional 
links are effectively exploited it could certainly help Cameroon combat poverty. 
However, in the current political environment these positive impacts are not likely to be 
realized.  
The objective of this paper was to answer two questions. First:  
1. Will the Kribi Deep Sea Port contribute positively to sustainable economic 
development in Cameroon?  
My original hypothesis was: The Port will bring increased revenues to the state, and 
provide some employment, but ultimately will not create sustainable development. The 
Port project will focus the economy on sectors that are infamously corrupt and 
unsustainable, thus most Cameroonian citizens are unlikely to feel the effects of the 
revenues it generates.  
 My research has led to me to confirm this hypothesis, yet for different reasons 
than those provided. I no longer believe that the extractive industries are inherently 
unsustainable, because they wealth they provide can be invested in sustainable 
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development projects. The chief reasons why I have confirmed this hypothesis are 
detailed in the preceding section: government corruption, poor coordination and long-
term planning in the government, the lack of technology transfer in Chinese investment, 
and the lack of an appropriate professional education infrastructure in Cameroon, which 
means that new employment opportunities will widen the gap between rich and poor.  
The second question I sought to answer was:  
2. How will the Kribi Deep Sea Port project impact Cameroon’s trade 
relationships with CEMAC countries and foreign partners?  
My original hypothesis was: Relationships among the CEMAC countries will be largely 
unchanged, because although they will all use the Port, the focus will be on exporting 
their goods abroad, not trading with one another. The Port will give China and the United 
States the opportunity to exploit Cameroonian resources more easily, while contributing 
comparatively little to the domestic economy.  
 My research has led me to reject my hypothesis regarding this question. While 
relationships among CEMAC countries may be initially unchanged, I think that the 
increases in the global profile, wealth, and infrastructure of the region will lead to 
increased links between its member states. They will certainly be exporting their goods 
abroad, but prior to my research I had not considered the potential positive externalities 
of this trade. As regards the exploitation of resources, I do not think this will be a major 
detrimental effect of the Port. Extraction of natural resources in Cameroon would occur 
with or without the Port; the Chad-Cameroon pipeline would still be in use, and foreign 
companies would still direct mining operations in the country. The Port will facilitate 
exploitation, but will not change the dynamics of those sectors significantly.  
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 The major impact the Port will have on Cameroon’s foreign partnerships is to 
encourage investment in the country. It is likely that more American companies, 
particularly in the oil sector, will invest in Cameroon. China, as described above, will 
become an even bigger player in the Cameroonian economy. The specific effects of these 
increased links are impossible to determine, but it is clear that for Cameroon to derive 
benefits from these relationships, the most important thing is their capacity to effectively 
negotiate the terms of trade. China, the United States, and Europe, are looking at 
Cameroon not as a charity case, but as a means to serve their own interests. The 
Cameroonian government must determine where overlapping points of interest lie.  
Finally, while there is adequate information to accept and reject, respectively, my 
hypotheses, none of the predictions given here can be taken as fact. The predictions are 
based on an analysis of the facts, the historical precedents, and the various accounts of 
Port stakeholders – yet this does not mean that circumstances cannot change. I can only 
hope that the many intelligent and energetic people who have contributed to my research 
will devote some part of their energies to disproving my findings, and ensuring that the 
Port is a success felt by all Cameroonians. It may be rife with obstacles, but it is not a lost 
cause. 
There are some things that will certainly be lost to history: the town of Kribi, and 
the incredible human and animal diversity of the immediate Port region. No matter how 
rich the country becomes, these are things that cannot be retrieved. It is partly because of 
this significant loss that the success of the Port project is so important. Cameroon is 
paying a high price by giving up this part of its beauty and heritage, so it is vital that the 
benefits to the country are made to outweigh the substantial costs it is incurring.   
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1. Eric Bisil, CED extractive industries: ebisil@CED.org  
2. Santiago Ormeno, UNIDO: Santiago.ormeno@gmail.com  
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dnsomotto@kribiport.cm ; 99.91.87.80 
4. Roland AMOUGOU, Port Direction committe in Kribi: 77.11.88.75; 77.18.67.48 
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Appendix B: Interview Questions  
US Embassy 
Will the Port be a positive step for Cameroonian economic development?   
Does the United States hope to benefit from the use of the Port? If so, for what purposes?  
How will the Port affect the relationship between the United States and Cameroon, if at all?  
Did the US offer a loan to build the port? Why or why not? 
Ministry of Commerce 
Comment est-ce que le Port va changer les systèmes d’échange dans la région et le monde?  
Est-ce que le Port va changer les relations entre Cameroun et ses partenaires d’échanges?  
Quels produits seront les exports primaires du Port?  
Quels produits seront les imports primaires?  
Quels pays étrangers vont utiliser le Port? 
Quels seront les destinations pour les revenues qui sont crées par ces nouveaux échanges?  
Comment est-ce que l’échange va affecter les industries domestiques? Par exemple les industries 
extractive, et l’industrialisation?  
Louis Berger 
What does your company do?  
How did the project get started, what was the process of recruiting companies like? How did your 
company get chosen?  
GeoVic  
What does your company do?  
Roughly what percentage of the employees in Cameroon are Cameroonian?  
Are most mining companies in Cameroon based in other countries?  
Do you think the Kribi Port will affect your business at all? If so, how?  
Is the Port an incentive for mining companies to expand or for investors to come to Cameroon?  
Does the government support the mining industries in Cameroon? How?  
So how much of the revenue leaves the country?  
Is mining a good industry to invest in for the economic development between Cameroon? 
People often talk about the lack of transparency in the extractive industries – what exactly does 
that mean?  
I’ve read some things about overlapping land-use permits being an issue? Has your company 
faced this?  
Chinese Embassy 
How will the Port benefit Cameroon and China, and their trade relationship?  
Is CHEC, the company constructing the Port, state-owned?  
What does China hope for the future of their relationship with Cameroon?  
What does China hope to export to Cameroon using the port? 
What does China hope to import from Cameroon using the port? 
How did the idea for the Port originate? 
Do you know how and when Cameroon is planning to pay back the loan to ExIm Bank?  
Why Cameroon? 
General Interview Questions: used in multiple interviews  
What does your office/organization/ministry do in Cameroon?  
Have your offices had any role, or done any advising, on the Port project?  
Do you think the Port will be a good thing for economic development in Cameroon? Why or why 
not?  
Do you think focusing on the extractive industries is a good way to promote economic 
development in the country?  
Do you think the Port will increase China’s influence in the country? If so, is this a good or a bad 
thing?  
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Where will the revenues be directed? 
What is your personal opinion about the Port project?  
Is the Port meant to promote regional exchange between CEMAC countries, or to focus on trade 
with external powers like China and the U.S?  
Which companies will be spearheading the surrounding infrastructure and industrial projects? 
(agro, electronic, roads etc.)  
How will the Port impact the mining and oil sectors?  
How will the Port impact tourism in Kribi?  
Will ordinary Cameroonians, including those living in poverty, feel the benefits of the Port?  
Who will benefit the most from the Port?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
